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Abstract
Social dilemmas are situations where individuals
face a temptation to increase their payoffs at a
cost to total welfare. Building artificially intelli-
gent agents that achieve good outcomes in these
situations is important because many real world
interactions include a tension between selfish in-
terests and the welfare of others. We show how
to modify modern reinforcement learning meth-
ods to construct agents that act in ways that are
simple to understand, nice (begin by cooperating),
provokable (try to avoid being exploited), and for-
giving (try to return to mutual cooperation). We
show both theoretically and experimentally that
such agents can maintain cooperation in Markov
social dilemmas. Our construction does not re-
quire training methods beyond a modification of
self-play, thus if an environment is such that good
strategies can be constructed in the zero-sum case
(eg. Atari) then we can construct agents that solve
social dilemmas in this environment.
1. Introduction
Bilateral cooperative relationships, where individuals can
pay costs to give larger benefits to others, are ubiquitous in
our daily lives. In such situations mutual cooperation can
lead to higher payoffs for all involved but there always exists
an incentive to free ride. In a seminal work Axelrod asks a
practical question: since social dilemmas are so ubiquitous,
how should a person behave when confronted with one
(Axelrod, 1984)? In this work we will take up a variant of
that question: how can we construct artificial agents that
can solve complex bilateral social dilemmas?
First, we must define what it means to ‘solve’ a social
dilemma. The simplest social dilemma is the two player, re-
peated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). Here each player chooses
to either cooperate or defect each turn. Mutual cooperation
∗Facebook AI Research. Both authors contributed equally to
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earns high rewards for both players. Defection improves
one’s payoff but only at a larger cost to one’s partner. For the
PD, Axelrod & Hamilton suggest the strategy of tit-for-tat
(TFT): begin by cooperating and in later turns copy what-
ever your partner did in the last turn (Axelrod & Hamilton,
1981).
TFT and its variants (eg. Win-Stay-Lose-Shift, (Nowak
& Sigmund, 1993; Imhof et al., 2007)) have been studied
extensively across many domains including the social and
behavioral sciences, biology, and computer science. TFT is
popular for several reasons. First, it is able to avoid exploita-
tion by defectors while reaping the benefits of cooperation
with cooperators. Second, when TFT is paired with other
conditionally cooperative strategies (eg. itself) it achieves
cooperative payoffs. Third, it is error correcting because
after an accidental defection is provides a way to return to
cooperation. Fourth, it is simple to explain to a partner and
creates good incentives: if one person commits to using
TFT, their partner’s best choice is to cooperate rather than
try to cheat.
Our contribution is to expand the idea behind to TFT to a
different environment: one shot Markov social dilemmas
that require function approximation (eg. deep reinforcement
learning). We will work with the standard deep RL setup: at
training time, our agent is given access to the Markov social
dilemma and can use RL to compute a strategy. At test time
the agent is matched with an unknown partner and gets to
play the game with that partner once.
We will say that the agent can solve a social dilemma if
it can satisfy the four TFT properties listed above. We
call our strategy approximate (because we use RL function
approximation) Markov (because the game is Markov) tit-
for-tat (amTFT).
The first issue amTFT needs to tackle is that unlike in the PD
‘cooperation’ and ‘defection’ are no longer simple labeled
strategies, but rather sequences of choices. amTFT uses
modified self-play1 to learn two policies at training time: a
1We note that one advantage of amTFT is that it requires no
additional machinery beyond what is required by standard self-play,
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fully cooperative policy and a ‘safe’ policy (we refer to this
as defection).2
The second issue is that we are considering a setup where
our agent will only play the social dilemma once at test
time. Thus the goal of amTFT is to intelligently switch
between the learned policies within a single game.3 amTFT
performs this as follows: at each time step during test time
the amTFT agent computes the gain from the action their
partner actually chose compared to the one prescribed by the
cooperative policy. This can be done either using a learned
Q function or via policy rollouts. We refer to this as a per
period debit. If the total debit is below a threshold amTFT
behaves according to the cooperative policy. If the debit
is above the threshold, the agent switches to the defecting
policy for k turns and then returns to cooperation. This k is
computed such that the partner’s gains (debit) are smaller
than the losses they incur (k lost turns of cooperation).
We show both analytically and experimentally that amTFT
is a good strategy for Markov social dilemmas in the Ax-
elrod sense defined above. Using a grid-world, Coins, and
a modification of an Atari game where players must learn
from pixels we demonstrate experimentally that an impor-
tant component of amTFT is defining a partner’s ‘defec-
tion’ in terms of value and not actions. This choice makes
amTFT robust to a partner using one of a class of outcome-
equivalent cooperative policies as well function approxima-
tion, important properties for scaling agents beyond simple
games.
We note that for the purposes of this paper we define the
‘cooperative’ the policies as the ones which maximize the
sum of both players’ payoff. This definition seems natu-
ral for the case of the symmetric games we study (and is
the one that is typically used in eg. the literature on the
evolution of cooperation). However, it is well known that
human social preferences take into account distribution (eg.
inequity (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999)), various forms of altruism
(Andreoni, 1990; Peysakhovich et al., 2014), and context
dependent concerns (eg. social norms, see (Roth et al., 1991;
thus if we can construct competitive agents in some environment
(eg. Atari, (Mnih et al., 2015)) then we can also construct agents
that solve social dilemmas in that environment.
2In the PD this action is ‘defect’ but in most real social dilem-
mas this is not the case. For example social dilemmas occur natu-
rally in economic situations where agents face a choice of trading
and realizing gains from trade or simply producing everything they
need on their own. In this case a safe policy is the outside option
of ‘stop transacting with this agent.’
3The focus on a single test game is a way in which the problem
we consider differs from what is normally studied in the litera-
ture on maintaining cooperation in repeated games (Fudenberg &
Maskin, 1986; Littman & Stone, 2005; de Cote & Littman, 2008).
In a standard ‘folk theorem’ setup agents play a game repeatedly
and maintain cooperation in one iteration of a game by threats of
defection in the next iteration.
Herz & Taubinsky, 2014; Peysakhovich & Rand, 2015) for
how social norms affect economic games and can change
even in the lab). Thus when applying amTFT in other cir-
cumstances the correct ‘focal point’ needs to be chosen. The
automatic determination of focal points is an important topic
for future research but far beyond the scope of this paper.
However, we note that once this focal point is determined
the amTFT algorithm can be used exactly as in this paper
simply by swapping out the cooperative objective function
during training time.
1.1. Related Work
A large literature on the ‘folk theorem’ asks whether in
a repeated game there exists an equilibrium which main-
tains cooperative payoffs using strategies which take as
input histories of observations (Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986;
Dutta, 1995) and output stage-game actions. A computer sci-
ence branch of this literature asks whether it is possible to
compute such equilibria either in repeated matrix games
(Littman & Stone, 2005) or in repeated Markov games
(de Cote & Littman, 2008). These works are related to
our questions but have two key differences: first, they focus
on switching strategies across iterations of a repeated game
rather than within a single game. Second, perhaps more
importantly, this literature focuses on finding equilibria un-
like the Axelrod setup which focuses on finding a ‘good’
strategy for a single agent. This difference in focus is starkly
illustrated by TFT itself because both agents choosing TFT
is not an equilibrium (since if one agent commits to TFT
the partner’s best response is not TFT, but rather always
cooperate).
A second related literature focuses on learning and evolu-
tion in games (Fudenberg & Levine, 1998; Sandholm &
Crites, 1996; Shoham et al., 2007; Nowak, 2006; Conitzer
& Sandholm, 2007) with recent examples applying deep
learning to this question (Leibo et al., 2017; Perolat et al.,
2017). Though there is a large component of this litera-
ture focusing on social dilemmas, these works typically are
interested how properties of the environment (eg. initial
states, payoffs, information, learning rules used) affect the
final state of a set of agents that are governed by learning or
evolutionary dynamics. This literature gives us many useful
insights, but is not usually focused on the question of design
of a single agent as we are.
A third literature focuses on situations where long term in-
teractions with the same partner means that a good agent
needs to either to discern a partner’s type (Littman, 2001)
or be able shape the adaptation of a learning partner (Babes
et al., 2008; Foerster et al., 2017b). Babes et al. use re-
ward shaping in the Prisoner’s Dilemma to construct ‘leader’
agents that convince ‘followers’ to cooperate and Foerster
et al. uses a policy gradient learning rule which includes
an explicit model of the partner’s model. These works are
related to ours but deal with situations where interactions
are long enough for the partner to learn (rather than a single
iteration) and require either explicit knowledge about the
game structure (Babes et al., 2008) or the partner’s learning
rule (Foerster et al., 2017b).
There is a recent surge of interest in using deep RL to
construct agents that can get high payoffs in multi-agent
environments. Much of this literature focuses either on zero-
sum environments (Tesauro, 1995; Silver et al., 2016; 2017;
Brown et al., 2015; Kempka et al., 2016; Wu & Tian, 2016;
Usunier et al., 2016) or coordination games without an in-
centive to defect (Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2017a;
Riedmiller et al., 2009; Tampuu et al., 2017; Peysakhovich
& Lerer, 2017; Lazaridou et al., 2017; Das et al., 2017; Ev-
timova et al., 2017; Havrylov & Titov, 2017; Foerster et al.,
2016) and uses self-play to construct agents that can achieve
good outcomes.4 We show that applying this self-play ap-
proach naively does not produce agents that can solve social
dilemmas (see the Appendix for more discussion).
There is a large literature using the repeated PD to study hu-
man decision-making in social dilemmas (Fudenberg et al.,
2012; Bó & Fréchette, 2011). In addition, recent work in
cognitive science has begun to use more complex games
and RL techniques quite related to ours (Kleiman-Weiner
et al., 2016). However, while this work provides useful
insights into potentially useful strategies the main objective
of this work is to understand human decision-making, not
to actively improve the construction of agents.
Finally, Crandall et al. study how to construct machines
for social dilemma games (Crandall et al., 2017). This
work is the closest to our own of the recent literature but
differs in that it focuses specifically on cooperation with a
human partner in simple games using cheap talk (English)
communication from an exiting set of messages. Given
the importance of communication in human interactions
incorporating explicit signaling into amTFT-like strategies
is an important and interesting direction for future work.
2. The Basic Model
We now turn to formalizing our main idea. We will work
with a generalization of Markov decision problems:
Definition 1 A (finite, 2-player) Markov game consists of
a set of states S = {s1, . . . , sn}; a set of actions for each
player A1 = {a11, . . . , a1k}, A2 = {a21, . . . , a2k}; a transi-
tion function τ : S ×A1 ×A2 → ∆(S) which tells us the
probability distribution on the next state as a function of
4One example that is closer to our problem is (Lewis et al.,
2017) which applies deep RL to bargaining, which can be thought
of as an imperfect information general-sum game.
current state and actions; a reward function for each player
Ri : S×A1×A2 → R which tells us the utility that player
gains from a state, action tuple. We assume rewards are
bounded.
Players can choose between policies which are maps from
states to probability distributions on actions pii : S →
∆(Ai). We denote by Πi the set of all policies for a player.
Through the course of the paper we will use the notation pi
to refer to some abstract policy and pˆi to learned approxima-
tions of it (eg. the output of a deep RL procedure).
Definition 2 A value function for a player i inputs a state
and a pair of policies V i(s, pi1, pi2) and gives the expected
discounted reward to that player from starting in state s.
We assume agents discount the future with rate δ which we
subsume into the value function. A related object is the Q
function for a player i inputs a state, action, and a pair
of policies Qi(s, pi1, pi2) and gives the expected discounted
reward to that player from starting in state s taking action
a and then continuing according to pi1, pi2 afterwards.
We will be talking about strategic agents so we often refer
to the concept of a best response:
Definition 3 A policy for agent j denoted pij is a best re-
sponse starting at state s to a policy pii if for any pi′j and
any s′ along the trajectory generated by these policies we
have V j(s′, pii, pij) ≥ V j(s′, pii, pi′j). We denote the set of
such best responses as BRj(pii, s). If pij obeys the inequal-
ity above for any choice of state s we call it a perfect best
response.
The set of stable states in a game is the set of equilibria. We
call a policy for player 1 and a policy for player 2 a Nash
equilibrium if they are best responses to each other. We call
them a Markov perfect equilibrium if they are perfect best
responses.
We are interested in a special set of policies:
Definition 4 Cooperative Markov policies starting from
state s (piC1 , pi
C
2 ) are those which, starting from state s,
maximize V 1(s, pi1, pi2) + V 2(s, pi1, pi2). We let the set of
cooperative policies be denoted by ΠCi (c). Let the set of
policies which are cooperative from any state be the set of
perfectly cooperative policies.
A social dilemma is a game where there are no cooperative
policies which form equilibria. In other words, if one player
commits to always cooperate, there is a way for their partner
to exploit them and earn higher rewards at their expense.
Note that in a social dilemma there may be policies which
achieve the payoffs of cooperative policies because they
cooperate on the trajectory of play and prevent exploitation
by threatening non-cooperation on states which are never
reached by the trajectory.5
The state representation used plays an important role in
determining whether equilibria which achieve cooperative
payoffs exist. Specifically, a policy which rewards coop-
eration today with cooperation tomorrow must be able to
remember whether cooperation happened yesterday. In both
of our example games, Coins and the PPD, if the game is
played from the pixels without memory maintaining cooper-
ation is impossible. This is because the current state does
not contain information about past behavior of one’s partner.
Thus, some memory is required to create policies which
maintain cooperation. This memory can be learned (eg. an
RNN) or it can be an explicitly designed summary statistic
(our approach). However, adding memory does not remove
equilibria where both players always defect, so adding mem-
ory does not imply that self-play will find policies that main-
tain cooperation (Foerster et al., 2017b; Sandholm & Crites,
1996). In the appendix we show that even in the simplest
situation, the one memory repeated PD, always defecting
equilibria can be more robust attractors than ones which
maintain cooperation. amTFT is designed to get around this
problem by using modified self-play to explicitly construct
the cooperative and cooperation maintaining strategies as
well as then switching rule. We begin with the theory behind
amTFT.
3. Approximate Markov TFT
We begin with a social dilemma where pure cooperators
can be exploited. We aim to construct a simple meta-policy
which incentivizes cooperation along the path of play by
switching intelligently between policies in response to its
partner.
We assume that cooperative polices are exchangeable. That
is, for any pair (piC1 , pi
C
2 ), (pi
′C
1 , pi
′C
2 ) ∈ ΠCi (s) any com-
bination of the two (eg. (piC1 , pi
′C
2 ) is also in Π
C
i (s)) and
that all pairs give a unique distribution of the total rewards
between the two players.
If policies are not exchangeable or can give different dis-
tributions of the total payoff then in addition to having a
cooperation problem, we also have a coordination problem
(ie. in which particular way should agents cooperate? how
should gains from cooperation be split?). This is an impor-
tant question, especially if we want our agents to interact
with humans, and is related to the notion of choosing focal
points in coordination/bargaining games. However, a com-
5An example of such a policy is Grim Trigger in the one-
memory repeated PD. Grim Trigger cooperates if its partner has
always cooperated in the past and defects otherwise. Thus two
Grim players achieve the payoffs of two cooperators but do not
use policies that cooperate at every state.
plete solution is beyond the scope of this work and will often
depend on contextual factors. See eg. (Schelling, 1980; Roth
et al., 1991; Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2016; Peysakhovich &
Lerer, 2017) for more detailed discussion.
For the social dilemma to be solvable, there must be strate-
gies with worse payoffs to both players. Consider an equi-
librium (piD1 , pi
D
2 ) which has worse payoffs for player 2.
We assume that (piD1 , pi
D
2 ) is an equilibrium even if played
for a finite time, which we call piD-dominance. We use
piD-dominance to bound the payoffs of a partner during
the execution of a punishment phase, thus it is a sufficient
but not necessary condition. We discuss in the Appendix
how this assumption can be relaxed. To define this formally,
we first introduce the notation of a compound policy piXkZ
which is a policy that behaves according to X for k turns
and then Z afterwards.
Definition 5 We say a game is piD dominant (for player 2)
if for any k, any state s, and any policy piA we have
V2(s, pi
DkC
1 , pi
DkC
2 ) ≥ V2(s, piDkC1 , piAkC2 ).
In theory, with access to piC , piD, their Q functions, and no
noise or function approximation, we can construct amTFT
as follows. Suppose the amTFT agent plays as player 1 (the
reverse is symmetric).
At the start of the game the amTFT agent begins in phase C.
If the phase is C then the agent plays according to piC . At
each time step, if the agent is in a C phase, the agent looks
at the action a2 chosen by their partner. The agent computes
d = Q2CC(s, pi
C
1 (s), a2)−Q2CC(s, piC1 (s), piC2 (s)).
If d > 0 then starting at the next time step when state s′ is
reached the agent enters into a D phase where they choose
according to piD for k periods. k is computed such that
V2(s
′, piDkC1 , pi
DkC
2 )− V2(s′, piC1 , piC2 ) > αd.
Here α > 1 controls how often an agent can be exploited by
a pure defector. After this k is over the agent returns to the
C phase. The amTFT strategy gives a nice guarantee:
Theorem 1 Define d∗ = maxA2,s(Q2CC(s, piC1 (s), a) −
Q2CC(s, pi
C
1 (s), pi
C
2 (s))). If for any state s we have that
V2(s, pi
C
1 , pi
C
2 ) − V2(s, piD1 , piD2 ) > d
∗
δ then if player 1 is
an amTFT agent, a fully omniscient player 2 maximizes
their payoffs by behaving according to piC2 when 1 is in a
C phase and piD2 when 1 is in a D-phase. Thus, if agents
start in the C phase and there is no noise, they cooperate
forever. If they start in a D phase, they eventually return to
a C phase.
The proof is quite simple and we relegate it to the Appendix.
However, we now see that amTFT has the desiderata we
have asked for: it is easy to explain, it cooperates with a pure
cooperator, it does not get completely exploited by a pure
defector,6 and incentivizes cooperation along the trajectory
of play.7
4. Constructing an amTFT Agent
We now use RL methods to construct the components re-
quired for amTFT by approximating the cooperative and
defect policies as well as the switching policy. To construct
the required policies we use self-play and two reward sched-
ules: selfish and cooperative.
In the selfish reward schedule each agent i treats the other
agent just as a part of their environment and tries to max-
imize their own reward. We assume that RL training con-
verges and we call the converged policies under the selfish
reward schedule pˆiDi and the associated Q function approxi-
mations QˆiDD. If policies converge with this training then
pˆiD is a Markov equilibrium (up to function approximation).
In the cooperative reward schedule each agent gets rewards
both from their own payoff and the rewards the other agent
receives. That is, we modify the reward function so that it is
RCCi (s, a1, a2) = R1(s, a1, a2) +R2(s, a1, a2).
We call the converged policy and value function approxima-
tions pˆiCi and Qˆ
i
CC . In this paper we are agnostic to which
learning algorithm is used to compute policies.
In general there can be convergence issues with selfish self-
play (Fudenberg & Levine, 1998; Conitzer & Sandholm,
2007; Papadimitriou, 2007) while in the cooperative reward
schedule the standard RL convergence guarantees apply.
The latter is because cooperative training is equivalent to one
super-agent controlling both players and trying to optimize
for a single scalar reward.
With the value functions and policies in hand from the pro-
cedure above, we can construct an amTFT meta-policy. For
the purposes of this construction, we consider agent 1 as the
amTFT agent (but everything is symmetric). The amTFT
agent keeps a memory state (Wt, bt) which both start at 0.
The amTFT agent sees the action a′ of their partner at time
t and approximates the gain from this deviation as Dt =
Qˆ2CC(s, a
2
t ) − Qˆ2CC(s, piC2 (s)). To compute this debit we
can either use learned Q functions or we can simply use
6In an infinite length game amTFT will get exploited an infinite
number of times as it tries to return to cooperation after each D
phase. One potential way to avoid this to avoid this is to increase
α at each D phase.
7This makes amTFT subtly different from TFT. TFT requires
one’s partner to cooperate even during the D phase for the system
return to cooperation. By contrast, amTFT allows any action
during the D phase, this makes it similar to the rPD strategy of
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift or Pavlov (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993).
rollouts.
The amTFT agent accumulates the total payoff balance of
their partner as Wt = Wt−1 + Dt. If Wt is below a fixed
threshold T the amTFT agent chooses actions according
to piC . If Wt crosses a threshold T the mTFT agent uses
rollouts to compute a k such that the partner loses more
from pˆiDkC relative to cooperation than some constant α
times the current debit. The hyperparameters T and α trade
off robustness to approximation error and noise. Raising
T allows for more approximation error in the calculation
of the debit but relaxes the incentive constraints on the
agent’s partner. Raising αmakes the cost of defection higher
but makes false positives more costly. The algorithm is
formalized below:
Algorithm 1 Approximate Markov Tit For Tat (for Agent
1)
Input: pˆiC , pˆiD and their Qˆ;α, T
b← 0,W ← 0
while Game do
Qˆ comes from model or rollouts
D ← Qˆ2CC(s, a2)− Qˆ2CC(s, pˆiC2 (s))
if b = 0 then
Choose a← pˆiC1 (s)
W = W +D
end if
if b > 0 then
Choose a← pˆiD1 (s)
b = b− 1
end if
if W > T then
Compute kˆ(s, αW ) using rollouts
b = kˆ(s, αT )
W = 0
end if
end while
A key component of the amTFT strategy is the computation
of the per period debit Dt. In our experiments we do this
via use batched policy rollouts (a similar procedure is used
to calculate the length of the D phase, k). Each rollout is
computed as follows:
1. The amTFT agent has policy pairs (pˆiC1 , pˆi
C
2 ) and
(pˆiD1 , pˆi
D
2 ) saved from training
2. At time t when the state was s the amTFT agent com-
pares the action chosen by their partner which we de-
note as a′ to pˆiC2 (s)
3. If a′ = pˆiC2 (s) then Dt is set to 0
4. If a′ 6= pˆiC2 (s) then the amTFT agent simulates 2B
replicas of the game for M turns.
(a) Coins (b) PPD
Coins Defections Coins Total Payoff PPD Total Payoff
0 35000 0 35000 0 35000
−30
−20
−10
0
0
20
40
60
0
10
20
30
Number Games Played
Training Cooperative Selfish
(c) Training
Figure 1: In two Markov social dilemmas we find that standard self-play converges to defecting strategies while modified
self-play finds cooperative, but exploitable strategies. We use the results of these two training schedules to construct pˆiC and
pˆiD.
(a) In B of the replicates their partner starts with a′
and play continues according to (pˆiC1 , pˆi
C
2 ) - we
call this the ‘true path’
(b) In B of the replicates their partner starts with
pˆiC2 (s) and play continues according to (pˆi
C
1 , pˆi
C
2 )
- we call this the ‘counterfactual path’
(c) The amTFT agent takes the difference in the aver-
age total reward to the partner from the two paths
and uses that as Dt - this is an estimate of the
reward of the one shot deviation to a′ from the
recommended strategy pˆiC2 (s)
This procedure is an unbiased estimator of QCC in the limit
of large B and M but is computationally intensive at test
time.8 In games where an action today can only affect
payoffs up to M periods from now it suffices to use rollouts
of length M and elide the continuation value.
The value-based construction gives amTFT a particular ro-
bustness property - if the partner is not using pˆiC2 exactly
but is using a policy that is outcome equivalent to it the
estimated Dt values will end up being 0 in expectation and
so the amTFT agent will continue to cooperate. We will
see in our experiments that this property is important to the
success of amTFT in real Markov social dilemmas.
5. Experiments
We test amTFT in two environments: one grid-world and
one where agents must learn from raw pixels. In the grid-
8A less computationally demanding way to execute amTFT
is to use a model to approximate QCC directly. This is difficult
in practice since any bias in the model is accumulated across
periods and because the model needs to be accurate everywhere,
not just on the trajectory of piC . In the appendix we discuss some
results on learning a model Qˆ and improving the efficiency of such
procedures is an important direction for future work.
world game Coins two players move on a 5× 5 board. The
game has a small probability of ending in every time step,
we set this so the average game length is 500 time steps.
Coins of different colors appear on the board periodically,
and a player receives a reward of 1 for collecting (moving
over) any coin. However, if a player picks up a coin of the
other player’s color, the other player loses 2 points. The
payoff for each agent at the end of each game is just their
own point total. The strategy which maximizes total payoff
is for each player to only pick up coins of their own color;
however each player is tempted to pick up the coins of the
other player’s color.
We also look at an environment where strategies must be
learned from raw pixels. We use the method of (Tampuu
et al., 2017) to alter the reward structure of Atari Pong so
that whenever an agent scores a point they receive a reward
of 1 and the other player receives −2. We refer to this game
as the Pong Player’s Dilemma (PPD). In the PPD the only
(jointly) winning move is not to play. However, a fully
cooperative agent can be exploited by a defector.
We are interested in constructing general strategies which
scale beyond tabular games so we use deep neural networks
for state representation for both setups. We use standard
setups so we relegate the details of the networks as well as
the training to the appendix.
We perform both Selfish (self play with reactive agents re-
ceiving own rewards) and Cooperative (self play with both
agents receiving sum of rewards) training for both games.
We train 100 replicates for Coins and 18 replicates for the
PPD. In both games Selfish training leads to suboptimal
behavior while Cooperative training does find policies that
implement socially optimal outcomes. In Coins pˆiD agents
converge to picking up coins of all colors while social pˆiC
agents learn to only pick up matching coins. In PPD self-
ishly trained agents learn to compete and try to score while
Strategy SelfMatch Safety IncentC
piC 68 -58 -41
piD 2 0 -58
amTFT 63 -16 33
Grim 2 0 -59
(a) Coins
Strategy SelfMatch Safety IncentC
piC -1 -18 -14
piD -7 0 -19
amTFT -2 -1 2.5
Grim -7 0 -18
(b) PPD
Figure 2: In two Markov social dilemmas, amTFT satisfies the Axelrod desiderata: it mostly cooperates with itself, is robust
against defectors, and incentivizes cooperation from its partner. The ‘Grim’ strategy based on (de Cote & Littman, 2008)
behaves almost identically to pure defection in these social dilemmas. The result of standard self-play is piD. The full
tournament of all strategies against each other is shown in the Appendix.
prosocially trained agents gently hit the ball back and forth.
We evaluate the performance of various Markov social
dilemma strategies in a tournament. To construct a matchup
between two strategies we construct agents and have them
play a fixed length iteration of the game. Note that at train-
ing time we use a random length game but at test time we
use a fixed length one so that we can compare payoffs more
efficiently. We use 1000 replicates per strategy pair to com-
pute the average expected payoff. We compare pˆiC , pˆiD, and
amTFT.
We also compare the direct adaptation of the construction
in (de Cote & Littman, 2008). Recall that the folk theorem
algorithm maintains equilibria by threat of deviation later:
if either agent’s behavior in game iteration t does not accord
with the cooperative policy, both agents switch to a different
policy in the next repetition of the game. We adapt this to
the single test game setting as follows: the agent computes
policies pˆiC , pˆiD. If their partner j takes an action a in a state
s where a 6= pˆiCj (s) the agent switches to pˆiD forever. We
call this the Grim Trigger Strategy due to its resemblance to
the rPD strategy of the same name.
In both games we ask how well the strategies satisfy Ax-
elrod’s desiderata from the introduction. Specifically, we
would like to measure whether a strategy avoids exploitation,
cooperates with conditional cooperators, and incentivizes
its partner to cooperate.
Let Si(X,Y ) be the average reward to player i when a
policy of type X is matched with type Y . The metric
Safety(X) = S1(X,D)− S1(D,D).
measures how safe a strategy is from exploitation by a de-
fector. The more negative this value, the worse that piX is
exploited by a pure defector.
We measure a strategy’s ability to achieve cooperative out-
comes with policies of their same type as
SelfMatch(X) = S1(X,X).
This measure can be thought of as quantifying two things.
First, how much social welfare is achieved in a world where
everyone behaves according to strategy X . Second, while
we cannot enumerate all possible conditionally cooperative
strategies, in the case of Grim and amTFT this serves as an
indicator of how well they would behave against a particular
conditional cooperator - themselves.
Finally, we measure if X incentivizes cooperation from its
partner. For this we use the measure
IncentC(X) = S2(X,C)− S2(X,D).
The higher this number, the better off a partner is from
committing to pure cooperation rather than trying to cheat.
Figure 2 shows our metrics evaluated for the strategies of
always cooperate, always defect, amTFT and Grim. Pure
cooperation is fully exploitable and pure defection gets poor
payoffs when matched with itself. Neither pure C or pure
D incentivizes cooperation. However, amTFT avoids being
exploited by defectors, does well when paired with itself
and incentivizes cooperative strategies from its partner. We
also see that inferring a partner’s cooperation using the value
function (amTFT) is much more stable than inferring it via
actions as Grim immediately interprets any deviation from
its preferred cooperative strategy as defection.
6. amTFT As Teacher
The results above show that amTFT is a good strategy to
employ in a mixed environment which includes some co-
operators, some tit-for-tat agents and some defectors. In
particular, we have shown that amTFT is not exploited by
piD. However, what happens when amTFT’s partner is them-
selves a learning agent?
We consider what happens if we fix the one player (the
Teacher) to use a fixed policy but let the other player be a
selfish deep RL agent (the Learner). We perform the retrain-
ing in the domain of Coins.9 This retraining procedure can
9We tried to perform the retraining in the PPD but incentivizing
also be used as an additional metric of the exploitability of a
given strategy, rather than asking whether pˆiD can exploit it,
we ask whether a learner trying to maximize its own payoff
can find some way to cheat.
Recall that when selfish RL agents played with each other,
they converged to the Selfish ‘grab all coins’ strategy. We
see that Learners paired with purely cooperative teachers
learn to exploit the teachers, learners paired with pˆiD also
learn to exploit (this learning happens much slower because
a fully trained pˆiD policy is able to grab coins very quickly
and thus it is hard for a blank slate agent to learn at all),
however learners paired with amTFT learn to cooperate.
Note that choosing amTFT as a strategy leads to higher
payoffs for both the Learner and the Teacher, thus even if
we only care about the payoffs accrued to our own agent we
can do better with amTFT than a purely greedy strategy.
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Figure 3: Both purely selfish and purely cooperative Teach-
ers lead Learners to exploitative strategies. However,
amTFT Teachers lead Learners to cooperate and thus both
agents reach a higher payoff in the long-run.
7. Conclusion
Humans are remarkably adapted to solving bilateral social
dilemmas. We have focused on how to give artificial agents
this capability. We have shown that amTFT can maintain
cooperation and avoid exploitation in Markov games. In
addition we have provided a simple construction for this
strategy that requires no more than modified self-play. Thus,
amTFT can be applied to social dilemmas in many environ-
ments.
Our results emphasize the importance of treating agents
as fundamentally different than other parts of the environ-
ment. In particular, agents have beliefs, desires, learn, and
use some form of optimization while objects follow simple
fixed rules. An important future direction for construct-
cooperation via a shift to piD requires a low discount rate and we
found A3C to be unstable in this regime.
ing cooperative agents is to continue to incorporate ideas
from inverse reinforcement learning (Abbeel & Ng, 2004;
Ng et al., 2000) and cognitive science (Baker et al., 2009;
Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2016) to construct agents that exhibit
some theory of mind.
There is a growing literature on hybrid systems which in-
clude both human and artificial agents (Crandall et al., 2017;
Shirado & Christakis, 2017). In this work we have focused
on defining ‘cooperation’ as maximizing the joint payoff.
This assumption seems reasonable in symmetric situations
such as those we have considered, however, as we discuss
in the introduction it may not always be appropriate. The
amTFT construction can be easily modified to allow other
types of focal points simply by changing the modified re-
ward function used in the training of the cooperative strate-
gies (for example by using the inequity averse utility func-
tions of (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999)). However moving forward
in constructing agents that can interact in social dilemmas
with humans will require AI designers (and their agents)
to understand and adapt to human cooperative and moral
intutions (Yoeli et al., 2013; Hauser et al., 2014; Ouss &
Peysakhovich, 2015).
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8. Appendix
8.1. Standard Self-Play Fails to Discover Cooperative
Strategies in the Repeated PD
In a social dilemma there exists an equilibrium of mutual
defection, and there may exist additional equilibria of condi-
tional cooperation. Standard self-play may converge to any
of these equilibria. When policy spaces are large, it is often
the case that simple equilibria of constant mutual defection
have larger basins of attraction than policies which maintain
cooperation.
We can illustrate this with the simple example of the re-
peated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Consider a PD with payoffs of
0 to mutual defection, 1 for mutual cooperation, w > 1 for
defecting on a cooperative partner and−s for being defected
on while cooperating. Consider the simplest possible state
representation where the set of states is the pair of actions
played last period and let the initial state be (C,C) (this is
the most optimistic possible setup). We consider RL agents
that use policy gradient (results displayed here come from
using Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014), similar results were
obtained with SGD though convergence speed was much
more sensitive to the setting of the learning rate) to learn
policies from states (last period actions) to behavior.
Note that this policy space contains TFT (cooperate after
(C,C), (D,C), defect otherwise), Grim Trigger (cooperate
after (C,C), defect otherwise) and Pavlov or Win-Stay-
Lose-Shift (cooperate after (C,C), (D,D), defect other-
wise (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993)) which are all cooperation
maintaining strategies (though only Grim and WSLS are
themselves full equilibria).
Each episode is defined as one repeated PD game which
lasts a random number of periods with stopping prob-
ability of stopping .05 after each period. Policies in
the game are maps from the one-memory state space
{(C,C), (D,C), (C,D), (D,D)} to either cooperation or
not. These policies are trained using policy gradient and the
REINFORCE algorithm (Williams, 1992). We vary w and
set s = 1.5w such that (C,C) is the most efficient strategy
always. Note that all of these parameters are well within the
range where humans discover cooperative strategies in ex-
perimental applications of the repeated PD (Bó & Fréchette,
2011).
Figure 4 shows that cooperation only robustly occurs when
it is a dominant strategy for both players (w < 0) and thus
the game is no longer a social dilemma.10.
10Note that these results use pairwise learning and therefore are
different from evolutionary game theoretic results on the emer-
gence of cooperation (Nowak, 2006). Those results show that
indeed cooperation can robustly emerge in these kinds of strategy
spaces under evolutionary processes. Those results differ because
they rely on the following argument: suppose we have a popula-
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Figure 4: Results from training one-memory strategies using policy gradient in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Even in
extremely favorable conditions self-play fails to discover cooperation maintaining strategies. Note that temptation payoff .5
is not a PD and here C is a dominant strategy in the stage game.
8.2. Proof of Main Theorem
To prove the theorem we will apply the one deviation princi-
ple. To show this, we fix player 1 to be an amTFT agent and
look at player 2. Note that from the point of view of player
2 this is now a Markov game with a state representation
of (s, k) where if k = 0 player 1 behaves according to piC
and if k > 0 player 1 is in the D phase and thus behaves
according to piDkC .
We consider the policy for player 2 of ‘play piC2 when player
1 is in the C phase and play piD2 when player 1 is in the D
phase.’ Recall by the Principle of Optimality if there does
not exist a one shot deviation a′ at any state under which
player 2 earns a higher payoff, then there does not exist a
better policy than the one prescribed.
Consider starting at k > 0. The suggested policy has player
2 play piDkC2 . By pi
D-dominance this is the best response to
piDkC1 so there are no one-shot deviations in the D phase.
Let us consider what happens in the C phase (k = 0). By
the assumption of the theorem at any state s we know that
V2(s, pi
C
1 , pi
C
2 )− V2(s, piD1 , piD2 ) >
d∗
δ
.
tion of defectors. This can be invaded by mutants of TFT because
TFT can try cooperation in the first round. If it is matched with a
defector, it loses once but it then defects for the rest of the time,
if it is matched with another TFT then they cooperate for a long
time. Thus, for sufficiently long games the risk of one round of
loss is far smaller than the potential fitness gain of meeting another
mutant. Thus TFT can eventually gain a foothold. It is clear why
in learning scenarios such arguments cannot apply.
Let {rt2(s, pi1, pi2)} be the per-period reward stream (note
here each r is a random variable) for player 2 induced by
the policies pi1, pi2. Since
V2(s, pi1, pi2) = E
[
δt
∞∑
t=0
rt2(s, pi1, pi2)
]
where δ is the discount rate. Because rewards are bounded
then for any  > 0 there exists k such that
|V2(s, pi1, pi2)−
k∑
t=0
δtrt2| < .
That is, the first k terms time steps approximate the full
discounted expectation arbitrarily well. This also means
that for some k
V2(s, pi
C
1 , pi
C
2 )− V2(s, piDkC1 , piDkC2 ) >
d∗
δ
.
From any state, the highest profit an agent can make from
deviating from piC2 with a single action with an amTFT
partner is d∗. However we have shown that there exists a
length k such that moving to D for k turns costs the agent
more than d
∗
δ . Therefore there is no time during the C phase
they wish to deviate. This completes the proof.
8.3. Aside on piD-Dominance
The reason we made the piD-dominance assumption is to
bound the expected payoff of an agent playing against piDkC
and therefore bound the necessary length of a D phase
after a particular deviation. However, in order to compute
what the length of the D phase the amTFT agent needs
access to the best response policy to piDkC , or its associated
value function. With piD-dominance we assume that piD is
that best response. Even if piD-dominance does not strictly
hold, it is likely a sufficient approximation. If necessary
however, one can train an RL agent on episodes where their
partner plays piDkC , where k is observed. This allows one
to approximate the best response policy to piDkC which
will then give us what we need to compute the responses
to deviations from piC in the D phase that incentivize full
cooperation.
8.4. Experimental Details
We used rollouts to calculate the debit to the amTFT’s part-
ner at each time period. This estimator has good perfor-
mance for both PPD and Coins given their reward structure.
It is also possible to use a learned model of Q. Learning
a sufficiently accurate model Qˆ is challenging for several
reasons. First, it has to have very low bias, since any bias
in Qˆ will be accumulated over periods. Second, the one-
shot deviation principle demands that Qˆ be accurate for
all state-action pairs, not just those sampled by the policies
(piC , piC). Standard on-policy value function estimation will
only produce accurate estimates of Q at states sampled by
the cooperative policies. As an example, in Coins, since the
cooperative policies never collect their partner’s coins Qˆ for
these state-action pairs may be inaccurate.
We found that it was possible in Coins to learn a model Qˆ to
calculate debit without policy rollouts using the same neu-
ral network architecture that was used to train the policies.
However, we found that in order to train a Qˆ model accurate
enough to work well we had to use a modified training pro-
cedure. After finishing Selfish and Cooperative training, we
perform a second step of training using a fixed (converged)
pˆiC . In order to sample states off the path of pˆiC during this
step, the learner behaves according to a mixture of piC , piD,
and random policies while the partner continues according
to pˆiC . Qˆ is updated via off-policy Bellman iteration. We
found this modified procedure produced a Qˆ function that
was good enough to maintain cooperation (though still not
as efficient as rollouts). For more complex games, an im-
portant area for future work is to develop methodologies to
compute more accurate approximations of Q or combine a
Qˆ model with rollouts effectively.
8.4.1. COINS GAME AND TRAINING
For Coins there are four actions (up, down, left, right), and
S is represented as a 4× 5× 5 binary tensor where the first
two channels encode the location of the each agent and the
other two channels encode the location of the coin (if any
exist). At each time step if there is no coin on the board a
coin is generated at a random location with a random color,
with probability 0.1.
A policy pi(s; θ) : s → ∆(a) is learned via the advantage
actor critic algorithm. We use a multi-layer convolutional
neural network to jointly approximate the policy pi and state-
value function Vˆ . For this small game, a simpler model
could be used, but this model generalizes directly to games
with higher-dimensional 2D state spaces (e.g. environments
with obstacles). For a given board size k, the model has
dlog2(k)e+ 1 repeated layers, each consisting of a 2D con-
volution with kernel size 3, followed by batch normalization
and ReLU. The first layer has stride 1, while the succes-
sive layers each have stride 2, which decreases the width
and height from k to dk/2e while doubling the number of
channels. For the 5× 5 board, channel sizes are 13, 26, 52,
104. From these 104 features, pi is computed via a linear
layer with 4 outputs with softmax, to compute a distribution
over actions, while the value function is computed via a
single-output linear layer.
The actor and critic are updated episodically with a common
learning rate - at the end of each game we update the model
on a batch of episodes via
∆θi = λ
(
At
∂V (st)
∂θi
+ A˜t log pi(st, at)
∂pi(st, at)
∂θi
)
where A is the advantage
At = rt + δV (st+1)− V (st)
and A˜ is the advantaged normalized over all episodes and
periods in the batch
A˜t =
At − |A|
σ(A)
.
We train with a learning rate of 0.001, continuation proba-
bility .998 (i.e. games last on average 500 steps), discount
rate 0.98, and a batch size of 32. We train for a total of
40, 000 games.
8.4.2. PONG PLAYER DILEMMA TRAINING
We use the arcade learning environment modified for 2-
player play as proposed in (Tampuu et al., 2017), with
modified rewards of +1 for scoring a point and -2 for be-
ing scored on. We train policies directly from pixels, us-
ing the pytorch-a3c package https://github.com/
ikostrikov/pytorch-a3c.
Policies are trained directly from pixels via A3C (Mnih et al.,
2016). Inputs are rescaled to 42x42 and normalized, and we
augment the state with the difference between successive
frames with a frame skip of 8. We use 38 threads for A3C,
over a total of 38,000 games (1,000 per thread). We use
the default settings from pytorch-a3c: a discount rate of
0.99, learning rate of 0.0001, 20-step returns, and entropy
regularization weight of 0.01.
The policy is implemented as a convolutional neural network
with four layers, following pytorch-a3c. Each layer uses a
3x3 kernel with stride 2, followed by ELU. The network
has two heads for the actor and critic. We elide the LSTM
layer used in the pytorch-a3c library, as we found it to be
unnecessary.
8.4.3. TOURNAMENT RESULTS
(a) Coins Results (b) PPD Results
Figure 5: Results of the tournament in two Markov social dilemmas. Each cell contains the average total reward of the row
strategy against the column strategy. amTFT achieves close to cooperative payoffs with itself and achieves close to the
defect payoff against defectors. Its partner also receives a higher payoff for cooperation than defection.
